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TWO WAYS TO THINK ABOUT THE PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS
Albert W. Alschuler ∗
This article compares the criminal punishment of corporations in the twenty-first century
with two ancient legal practices—deodand (the punishment of animals and objects that have
produced harm) and frankpledge (the punishment of all members of a group when one member
of the group has avoided apprehension for a crime). 1 It argues that corporate criminal
punishment is a mistake but that viewing it as frankpledge is less ridiculous than viewing it as
deodand. The article considers the implications of the choice between these concepts for
standards of corporate guilt and for the sentencing of corporate offenders.
After a brief historical description of deodand and frankpledge, the article traces the
history of corporate criminal liability from William Blackstone through Arthur Andersen. It
emphasizes that this liability punishes the innocent, and it argues that the punishment of innocent
shareholders and employees should not be regarded as “collateral” or “secondary.”
The article notes that subjecting corporations and their officers to punishment for the
same crimes creates sharp conflicts of interest. It reviews the history of the Justice Department’s
efforts to exploit these conflicts—initially by encouraging corporate officers to deliver corporate
guilty pleas to gain leniency for themselves and more recently by pressing corporations to gather
and deliver information about their employees.
The article suggests that defenses of corporate criminal liability fall into two categories.
Arguments in the first category are expressive and match those that once might have defended
∗

Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the
University of Chicago. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Linda Alschuler, Rachel Barkow, Richard Epstein,
James Jacobs, Morris Hoffman, and Stephen Presser.
1
I first offered this comparison 18 years ago at the end of a comment on two conference papers. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307,
312-13 (1991). Sara Sun Beale, Cheryl Evans, and the editors of the American Criminal Law Review encouraged me
to revisit the comparison and, as they say in Congress, extend my remarks.

deodand. Arguments in the second category are instrumental and match those that once might
have supported frankpledge.
“Expressive retributivists” champion the deodand perspective. They blame mindless
legal entities for crimes committed by their employees. This article considers the implications of
their arguments.
Other defenders of corporate criminal liability view it as frankpledge—a device for
persuading everyone in an organization to monitor everyone else. This article questions the
propriety of declaring some people guilty of other people’s crimes simply to encourage them to
police one another. On the assumption that corporate liability is here to stay, however, the article
argues that it is better regarded as a means to induce internal monitoring than as bona fide
criminal punishment.
This article then considers the implications of the deodand and frankpledge positions.
Neither of these positions justifies the federal rule of respondeat superior that authorizes the
conviction of a corporation whenever an employee acting within the scope of his employment
has committed a crime. The champions of both the deodand and frankpledge positions have in
fact sought revision of this rule.
Expressive retributivists propose replacing the rule with a “corporate ethos” standard.
The article argues, however, that this standard is incoherent and unworkable. The reform
advocated by the frankpledge proponents is more sensible. If the goal of corporate criminal
liability is to induce appropriate monitoring, the creation and maintenance of an appropriate
corporate compliance program should provide a defense to liability.
Proposals for such a defense have not fared well, and this article considers their
prospects. It suggests that, although the respondeat superior standard is truly indefensible, it

survives because it affords broad powers to prosecutors. The article examines how prosecutors
have used and misused their extraordinary powers.
A final section of this article considers the implications of the frankpledge perspective for
sentencing corporate offenders. A judge’s goal in punishing a corporation should be to induce a
level of monitoring that will prevent more criminal harm than the monitoring will cost.
I. DEODAND
The term deodand refers to the punishment of an animal or inanimate object that has
killed a person. 2 The Book of Exodus endorsed the practice: “If an ox gore a man or a woman,
that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten . . . .” 3 A
standard reference is Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals by E. P. Evans,
published in 1906. 4 As one alphabetically minded reader of this work noted, it chronicled 191
actions against “asses, beetles, bloodsuckers, bulls, caterpillars, cockchafers, cocks, cows, dogs,
dolphins, eels, field mice, flies, goats, grasshoppers, horses, locusts, mice, moles, rats, serpents,
sheep, slugs, snails, swine, termites, turtledoves, weevils, wolves, [and] worms . . . .” 5

2

The word refers specifically to the English practice of forfeiting the offending animal or object to the Crown and
then using the proceeds for charitable purposes. The literal translation of deodand is “given to God.” I use the word
more generically to encompass the official condemnation of animals and objects not only in England but in other
places.
3
Exodus 21:28 (King James).
4
E. P. E VANS, THE CRIMINAL P ROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (Faber and Faber 1987)
(1906).
5
Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and
Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 708 (1916). Most prosecutions apparently involved pigs, for pigs ran through
European streets for centuries and “were frequently involved in altercations, particularly with small children.” Paul
Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals
and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288, 298 (1994). See generally Louise Harmon, The Day the Dogs Died:
A Mad Essay on the Perils of Alien Scholarship, or an Alien Essay on the Perils of Mad Scholarship, 23 LEGAL
STUD. F. 1, 14 (1999); Anna Pervukhin, All the Lizards Stand and Say “Yes, Yes, Yes”: The Element of Play in
Legal Actions against Animals and Inanimate Objects (Bepress Legal Series Working Paper No. 96, 2003),
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/96.

Under English law, any chattel found by a jury to have caused death was forfeit to the
Crown.6 In the Case of the Lord of the Manor of Hampstead, 7 “[a] cart met a wagon loaded upon
the road, and the cart endeavouring to pass by . . . overturned, and threw the person that was in
the cart just before the wheels of the waggon.” 8 The jury found that the cart, wagon, loadings,
and horses were all deodands because they had “moved [unto death].” 9
Oliver Wendell Holmes devoted the first chapter of his legal classic The Common Law to
deodands. 10 Among his many illustrations: When someone was killed by a fall from a tree, “the
rude Kukis of Southern Asia” required this person’s relatives to cut down the tree and scatter it
in chips. 11 Holmes argued that primitive people attributed intentionality and blame to inanimate
objects. Noting that proceedings in admiralty were still brought against vessels and that everyone
called vessels “she,” he observed, “If [following a ship accident] we should say to an uneducated
man to-day, ‘She did it and she ought to pay for it,’ it may be doubted whether he would see the
fallacy, or be ready to explain that the ship was only property.” 12 In light of Holmes’s view of
the common man, it is easy to see why someone called him the Yankee from Olympus. 13 And it
is easy to see why he declared in this chapter that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic.” 14
II. FRANKPLEDGE

6

2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 472-73 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1968) (1898) (“Horses, oxen, carts, boats, mill-wheels and
cauldrons were the commonest of deodands. In English men called the deodand the bane, that is, the slayer.”).
7
Case of the Lord of the Manor of Hampstead, (1704) 91 Eng. Rep. 195, 195 (K.B.).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 195-96 (adding that “if a tree shall fall upon the branch of another tree, and both fall to the ground, and the
branch kills a man, the tree and branch are both forfeited”) (emphasis omitted).
10
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, J R., THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (Dover 1991) (1881).
11
Id. at 19.
12
Id. at 28-29; see POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 474 (“[I]t is hard for us to acquit ancient law of that
unreasoning instinct that impels the civilised man to kick, or consign to eternal perdition, the chair over which he
has stumbled.”).
13
See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS F AMILY (1945).
14
HOLMES, supra note 10, at 1.

Frankpledge was an English institution in which ten men were bound together and held
responsible for delivering anyone in any of their ten households who had committed a crime. If
the criminal escaped, all ten members of the tithing were fined. 15 A precursor of this practice was
in existence at least by the time of King Edgar the Peaceful, 16 who died in 975 and whose
mistress was named Wulfthryth. 17 A law of Edgar’s reign required every man to have a borh (or
surety), and it said, “[I]f any one then do wrong and run away, let the borh bear that which he
ought to bear.” 18 The Normans translated the Anglo-Saxon word frithborh as frankpledge and
used the institution effectively. 19 There were no professional police forces, but frankpledge gave
everyone the job of capturing wrongdoers. When the members of a tithing allowed a criminal to
escape, they were punished collectively for this default. F. W. Maitland speculated that
frankpledge led to the jury of presentment or grand jury. 20 Even after the members of a
community were freed of the obligation to capture wrongdoers, they were required to tell the
sheriffs and justices what they knew.
III. THE COMMON LAW VIEW OF CORPORATE CRIME

15

1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 13 (3d ed. 1922) (1903); see also POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 568-71 (noting variations on the frankpledge system described in text). The definitive
work is WILLIAM ALFRED MORRIS, THE FRANKPLEDGE SYSTEM (1910).
16
See Frankpledge, 11 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 34 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1910).
17

See Edgar, 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 933 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1910). Edgar was the father ofEf
Ethelred the Unready, whom John Cleese portrayed in Monte Python films. See id.; John Cleese Filmography,
MOVIE PLANETS, http://movieplanets.com/imdbphp/imdb_person.php?mid=0000092.
18
Frankpledge, supra note 16; see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 19 (describing this law as “the last step in the
establishment of general peace suretyship”).
19
Frankpledge, supra note 16, at 34; see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 31 (The “name seems to be nothing but a
Norman version of the word used in the everyday speech of the English people.”). But see id. at 2 (suggesting that
“franc pledge” was a translation of the Latin term “plegium liberale”). Morris offers evidence that the Normans
organized the frankpledge system during the reign of William the Conqueror and that frankpledge differed
significantly from its Anglo-Saxon predecessors. See id. at 8-41. Notably, although earlier systems required every
man to find a surety, they did not force anyone to become one. In the earlier systems, principals and sureties
apparently struck their own bargains.
20
See F. W. Maitland, Introduction to 2 SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS xi, xxxvixxxvii (F. W. Maitland ed., Professional Books, Ltd. 1974) (1889); see also ALBERT BEEBE WHITE, THE MAKING OF
THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 175, 181 (2d ed., rev. 1925).

Comment [A1]: I changed it to Ethelred.

Frankpledge vanished long before Blackstone wrote his Commentaries in the eighteenth
century, 21 but deodand persisted. It was abolished in England only in 1846. 22 Yet Blackstone
viewed this practice as hopelessly primitive. He attributed it to superstition and claimed that it
had arisen “in the blind days of popery.” 23
For Blackstone, criminal guilt was personal. He wrote, “Punishments are . . . only
inflicted for that abuse of that free will, which God has given to a man.” 24 In accordance with
this view, Blackstone declared that “[a] corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other
crime.” 25 He regarded the point as so obvious that it needed no elaboration.
IV. THE CURRENT A MERICAN V IEW
A. Bye, Bye Blackstone: New York Central and Its Progeny
The year 2009 marks the centennial of a giant step backwards. In 1909, in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States,26 the Supreme Court muttered
something about “public policy” 27 and the power of the corporation in “modern times.” 28 It then
upheld a federal statute that punished corporations criminally for charging their customers too
little—for undercutting government-fixed prices. 29 The Court not only recognized Congress’s

21
See Frankpledge, supra note 16, at 35 (declaring that, although frankpledge was in “active operation” in 1376, it
soon began to fall into disuse and vanished altogether during the Tudor period).
22
See Deodands Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.). In the years just preceding 1846, coroners seeking to
compensate the families of workers killed in industrial accidents had resurrected the use of deodands. See Harry
Smith, From Deodand to Dependency, 11 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 389 (1967). Deodand’s close cousin, the in rem
forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, persists in America today. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442
(1996) (upholding the forfeiture of a wife’s interest in a jointly owned automobile after her husband had sex with a
prostitute in the vehicle). Indeed, revenue-hungry American legislatures have expanded instrumentality forfeiture far
beyond its common law boundaries by requiring the forfeiture of real estate as well as personal property. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1963(b)(1) (2006).
23
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300.
24
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27.
25
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *476; see also Anonymous Case (No. 935), (1706) 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518
(K.B.) (“A corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it are.”).
26
212 U.S. 481 (1909).
27
Id. at 494-95.
28
Id. at 495.
29
Id.

power to punish corporations (an appropriate mark of judicial restraint) but also praised
Congress’s exercise of this power. It called the common law rule articulated by Blackstone an
“old and exploded doctrine.” 30
New York Central upheld a statute that expressly punished corporations. It did not
suggest that statutes silent on the subject should be read to authorize the prosecution of these
entities. The Court wrote in fact, “[T]here are some crimes[] which in their nature cannot be
committed by corporations,” 31 but no one had any idea what crimes the Court had in mind. After
the decision in New York Central, the Supreme Court and other courts generally read criminal
statutes to impose corporate criminal liability even in the absence of any indication that Congress
or a state legislature favored this outcome. 32
The statute upheld in New York Central authorized corporate punishment whenever an
“agent or other person acting for or employed by [the corporation] acting within the scope of his
employment” violated the statute’s prohibitions. 33 The Supreme Court did not consider whether
the same rule of respondeat superior would apply when statutes were silent on the subject.

30
Id. at 496. State courts had begun to allow the prosecution of corporations in the mid-nineteenth century, and
although “the early prosecutions were for crimes involving a corporation’s failure to act, . . . the distinction between
offenses involving nonfeasance and misfeasance was short-lived.” Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate
Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 808-09 n.61 (1996). Several federal district courts had approved the criminal
punishment of corporations in the years just preceding New York Central. Id. at 810-12.
31
New York Central, 212 U.S. at 494.
32
See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States,
213 F. 926, 936 (8th Cir. 1914) (“The whole growth of the modern law tends to subject corporations, as nearly as
may be, to the same pains and penalties imposed upon individuals.”); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F.
506, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 161 N.E. 455, 455-56 (N.Y. 1928); People v. Star
Co., 120 N.Y.S. 498, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914); Vulcan
Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412, 414-15 (Wis. 1928).
33
The Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 57-103, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (current version codified in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.).
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Without much reflection, however, later decisions applied the respondeat superior principle of
New York Central whenever corporations were prosecuted. 34
Many states have approved a less sweeping standard of liability. Following the lead of
the Model Penal Code, they ordinarily limit a corporation’s responsibility to cases in which “the
commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.” 35 In the federal courts and other
states, however, a criminal act by any employee performing his customary duties and intended in
-part to benefit the corporation is sufficient. It is immaterial that the employee was specifically
directed not to perform the act 36 or that the corporation was among this employee’s victims. 37
Under the rule of respondeat superior, a single errant employee can cause the downfall of
a multi-national corporation and the loss of thousands of jobs. 38 Prosecutorial discretion and

34
See, e.g., Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945) (“The generally accepted rule is
thus laid down: ‘A corporation may be held criminally responsible for acts committed by its agents, provided such
acts were committed within the scope of the agents' authority or course of their employment.’”) (quoting current 19
C.J.S., Corporations § 1362 (2008), formerly § 861); Zito v. United States, 64 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1933)
(“Corporations speak and act through their agents. There is abundant proof in the instant case that one McNamara
was an agent of the appellant company and that he had authority to sell its products. Therefore, it naturally follows
that his actions . . . are binding upon appellant company.”).
35
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). At least twelve states have approved the Model
Penal Code formulation without significant modification, and a comparable number have approved standards based
on the Code that expand, modify, or clarify its ill-defined reference to “[h]igh managerial” agents. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmt. 5(c) n.37 (1985). For example, the New York statute defines “high managerial agent” as
any “officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation
of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.” N.Y. PENAL LAW §
20.20(1)(b) (McKinney 2009). See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 app. B (2006) (reviewing the law of each state).
36
See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 526
U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
38
Sara Sun Beale writes, “It is . . . true that liability can be imposed on corporations for the actions of corporate
employees, even in the absence of specific proof of corporate fault. This is not unique.” Sara Sun Beale, Is
Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1505 (2007). She notes two other instances of
vicarious criminal liability in the American criminal justice system (but only two):

most corporate managers’ terror of a criminal trial39 keep the collapse from happening often, but
the case of Arthur Andersen, LLP is a notorious example. In Andersen, the trial judge instructed
the jury that its members need not agree about which corporate employee committed the crime. 40
Some courts in fact have invited the conviction of a corporation even when none of its
employees was a criminal. These courts have envisioned the corporation as a Colossus aware of
everything that any of its employees know, and they have declared that the “collective
knowledge” of this imaginary giant can make the absence of mens rea on the part of any sentient
being immaterial. 41
Although the jurors in the Arthur Andersen case were not required to reach agreement
about which of the firm’s 85,000 employees 42 committed a crime, they returned a special verdict
reporting that they did agree; the criminal was an in-house lawyer, Nancy Temple. 43 One juror
complained that the judge’s instructions had “stacked the deck” in favor of the prosecution.
“They just forced us to come back with a guilty verdict,” said juror Wanda McKay. “One
[I]n some jurisdictions felony murder imposes liability for one of the most serious offenses on the basis
of vicarious strict liability. Similarly, in many jurisdictions an accomplice to one crime is also
responsible for other crimes committed as a natural and probable consequence of the offense he aided
and abetted, even if he does not assist or even know of the additional offenses. . . . Compared to
liability for homicide, corporate criminal liability for white collar offenses does not seem like such a
big deal.
Id. at 1514-15. Analogizing corporate criminal liability to felony-murder rule and to the natural-and-probableconsequences doctrine does not say anything nice about it. Unlike corporate criminal liability, however, the felonymurder rule and the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine do not punish the blameless; they simply hold
deliberate wrongdoers responsible for more than they intended. Corporate criminal liability does appear to be
unique.
39
Dale Osterle comments, “Since an indicted firm is a dead firm, a decision to defend an indictment is suicide.”
Dale A. Osterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow
Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough
Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 476 (2004).
40
Arthur Andersen Convicted of Obstruction of Justice--Firm to Cease Auditing Public Companies, FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June 15, 2002, at 456G1, available at LEXIS.
41
See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 854-56 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Sci.
Apps. Int’l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730,
738-39 (W.D. Va. 1974); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 535-37 (N.H. 1997).
42
See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen’s Fall from Grace is a Sad Tale of Greed and Miscues,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at A1 (reporting that Arthur Andersen employed 85,000 people worldwide).
43
See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 486 (2006); Arthur
Andersen Convicted, supra note 41.

person did one thing and tore the whole company down.” 44 Yet even after Arthur Andersen’s
conviction, the government never charged Nancy Temple with a crime. The Supreme Court’s
ultimate reversal of Andersen’s conviction 45 did not save the 85,000 jobs. 46
When the courts convict corporations of crimes, they do it without affording them the
full protection of the Bill of Rights. 47 For ever-shifting reasons, all of them bad, the Supreme
Court has held the privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to corporations. 48 Corporate

44

Arthur Andersen Convicted, supra note 41.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
46
See Brown & Dugan, supra note 423. Although the government did not charge Nancy Temple, it did charge and
enter a plea agreement with another Andersen employee, David Duncan. After the Supreme Court reversed
Andersen’s conviction, Duncan was permitted to withdraw his plea. Greg Farrell, Former Auditor Isn't Done with
Enron, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2005, at 7B. The Ford Pinto prosecution, in which a jury acquitted Ford Motor
Company of manslaughter, was another case in which prosecutors filed charges against a corporation while
declining to charge the individuals alleged to have committed its crime. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 45 (1983). Prosecutors did charge the individuals allegedly
responsible for the crimes of the Bankers Trust Corporation, but after the corporation entered a plea agreement and
paid a fine of $60 million, a jury acquitted these individuals of all of the 27 twenty-seven charges brought against
them. See Matthew L. Schwartz, Using the Criminal Law to Combat Insider Banking Misconduct, 35 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 371, 371-73 (2002).
47
See Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946) (“[C]orporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related matters.”). See generally Henning,
supra note 30.
48
The Court first held the privilege inapplicable to corporations in Hale v. Henkel. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). It declared
that a corporation was a “creature of the State” with “certain special privileges and franchises” and that “[t]here is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers.” Id. at
74-75. A later Supreme Court decision spoke of “[t]he [state’s] reserved power of visitation” and said that “the
visitatorial power . . . of necessity reaches the corporate books.” Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85
(1911).
An enterprise no more waives the privilege against self-incrimination by accepting a corporate charter,
however, than it waives any other constitutional right. Could the state force an entity that obtained a charter to waive
the right to jury trial? Or to stand trial without counsel? Do the state’s “visitatorial powers” entitle the police to
break down doors and seize corporate records without search warrants and without probable cause? Hale itself
reiterated an earlier ruling that a corporation retains some Fourth Amendment rights. 201 U.S. at 76-77 (discussing
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Moreover, the claim of a reserved “visitatorial power” as a reason for
denying the Fifth Amendment privilege collapsed when the Supreme Court held that unincorporated “collective
entities” could not claim the privilege either. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
The Court offered a second reason rationale for withdrawing the privilege in White. It declared that “[t]he
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.”
Id. at 698. It added that the privilege should not extend to any organization with “a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents.” Id. at 701. The Court argued that corporate records “embody no element of personal
privacy.” Id. at 700.
Following a grant of immunity from prosecution, however, the government may force an individual to
disclose his most intimate secrets without violating the privilege. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
441 (1972). As the Supreme Court now has recognized, “the Fifth Amendment protects against ‘compelled selfincrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.’” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976)
45

defendants must produce incriminating documents even when the act of producing these
documents would tend to incriminate them. Moreover, to ensure that corporations will not
benefit from the privilege, the Supreme Court requires corporate officers to produce these
records even when the act of production would incriminate them personally. 49 The exception to
the privilege for corporations swallows the rule applicable to individuals, and the tail wags the
dog. 50
B. Punishing the Innocent
Of course criminal punishment cannot really be borne by a fictional entity. 51 As Baron
Thurlow, a Lord Chancellor of England, put it sometime before 1792, a corporation has “no soul

(quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)). Because the Fifth Amendment privilege advances
purposes other than the protection of personal privacy, the fact that corporate records “embody no element of
personal privacy” supplies no reason for withholding the privilege.
White added a third reason rationale for withdrawing the privilege. It appears to be the only one still
standing:
The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations . . .
demand that the constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be
correspondingly effective . . . . Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records
and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible . . . .
White, 322 U.S. at 700. More recently, Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), declared that “recognizing a
Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental
impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one of the most serious problems confronting
law enforcement authorities.” Id. at 115.
The government, however, has no greater interest in enforcing the laws against white-collar crime than in
enforcing the laws against murder, rape, and robbery. The framers of the Constitution sacrificed the most effective
enforcement of these criminal prohibitions when they established the privilege, and there is no reason to imagine
that they meant a different rule to apply to the government’s investigations of crimes like price fixing and bribing
foreign officials. By punishing corporations without affording them the protections of the Bill of Rights, the
government has its cake and eats it too.
49
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113-14 (1988).
50
The Court’s distinction between corporations and individuals initially meant a great deal more than it does today.
Unlike corporations, individuals once were permitted to withhold documents whose contents would tend to
incriminate them. Today both corporations and individuals can usually be required to produce incriminating
documents. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
51
The Supreme Court has called the corporation “a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal.”
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809); see also Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (calling the corporation “an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law”).

to damn, no body to kick.” 52 This punishment is inflicted instead on human beings whose guilt
remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent employees, creditors,
customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too. The embarrassment of corporate
criminal liability is that it punishes the innocent along with the guilty. 53
The Justice Department’s Manual for United States Attorneys responds to this
embarrassment with a shrug: “Virtually every conviction of a corporation, like virtually every
conviction of an individual, will have an impact on innocent third parties.” 54 The Manual
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John Coffee recycled Thurlow’s remark as the title of a noted article. See John C. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn, No
Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386
(1981). With one brief interruption, Thurlow was Lord Chancellor from 1778 until 1792. He presumably made his
statement before leaving that position. See Alexander Wood Renton, Edward Thurlow Thurlow, 26 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 903-04 (Hugh Chisholm, ed., 11th ed. 1910). Many scholars have quoted Thurlow, but
no one has tracked his statement to a primary source. Coffee noted its quotation in MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1977).
53
The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century penology that gave rise to corporate criminal responsibility
rejected the concept of blame altogether. Roscoe Pound voiced the views of most serious thinkers about crime in the
Age of Darwin when he spoke of the legal system's “exaggerated respect for the individual,” declared that
behavioral science had “routed” the concept of free will, and wrote, “We recognize that in order to deal with crime
in an intelligent and practical manner we must give up the retributive theory.” Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing
Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Last Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (citations omitted). Pound and his contemporaries maintained that the criminal law and all
law should be entirely forward-looking and instrumental.
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in New York Central did not discuss penology, a noted 1927 article
on the criminal punishment of corporations did. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36
YALE L.J. 827 (1927). This article, which Henry Edgerton wrote ten years before his appointment to the D.C.
Circuit, declared, “[T]he assumption that crime involves ‘guilt’ is quite erroneous.” Id. at 842. Edgerton saw no
significant difference between crimes and torts., id. at 836, and he apparently viewed the retributivist position as a
form of sadism:
The argument against corporate criminal responsibility, that the corporation cannot itself be “guilty” and
therefore should not be punished, rests on the tacit assumption that the aim of criminal law is retributive . . .
consists, in other words, in the pleasure which some persons derive from the infliction of pain upon those
whom they conceive to deserve it.
Id. at 832. Edgerton announced,
The chief civilized purpose of criminal law is deterrence—the prevention of acts which are conceived to
injure one social interest or another. The question is not whose mind is “guilty,” but whose responsibility will
serve this deterrent purpose . . . . It seems evident that this purpose is further served if corporate criminal
responsibility is added to the criminal responsibility of the corporation’s representatives.
Id. at 833. He added, “Corporate criminal responsibility tends to prevent crime not only by influencing the
corporation’s representatives of all degrees to abstain from conducting its business in unlawful ways, but also by
influencing those of higher or remote degree to restrain subordinates.” Id. at 835.
54
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.1000 (2008).

discusses the unjustified pain caused by the punishment of corporations under the heading
“Collateral Consequence,” listing it as one of many things a prosecutor “may consider” in
deciding whether to file charges and enter deferred prosecution agreements. 55 Sara Sun Beale
observes:
In the case of corporate sanctions, employees may lose their jobs and their retirement
security, and investors may be hard hit. . . . Are these secondary effects distinctive?
Unfortunately, they are not. The secondary impacts of federal drug policies dwarf the
effect of policies regarding corporate and white collar offenses. 56
Beale then describes how the mass incarceration of drug offenders has devastated families and
neighborhoods.57
The analogy is flawed. When an offender with children is sent to prison, his children may
suffer, yet criminal justice officials may have no way to punish the offender appropriately
without hurting other people. 58 The human perpetrators of the crimes now attributed to
corporations, however, can be convicted and incarcerated without punishing innocent
shareholders and employees as well. Undeserved suffering that can be avoided should be
avoided. 59
The penalties imposed on innocent shareholders and employees when corporations are
convicted are not incidental, collateral, or secondary. They are what the punishment of a

55
Id.; see also id. at § 9-28.300 (listing as one of nine factors a prosecutor “should” consider “collateral
consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and
others not proven personally culpable”).
56
Beale, supra note 38, at 1522.
57
Id. at 1522-23 (quoting Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 206-07 (1998)).
58
Courts, sentencing commissions, and legislatures should do much more than they currently do to minimize the
secondary effects of criminal punishment. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Third Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1383 (2002).
59
Defenders of corporate criminal liability note that it may be impossible to determine which corporate employees
committed a crime, especially when all of them point fingers at one another. See, e.g., Edgerton, supra note 54, at
834. Imagine, however, that Mom or Dad or both of them have killed their only child. Mom denies her guilt and
accuses Dad; Dad denies his guilt and accuses Mom. No physical or other evidence reveals which parent is telling
the truth, if either of them is. The prosecutor concludes that neither Mom nor Dad can be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Is the appropriate solution to convict the “marital entity”? Or the “family”?

collective entity is all about. The description of these penalties as collateral simply illustrates the
persistent power of mystical deodand thinking. Professor Beale and the authors of the U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual apparently classify the punishment of the corporate entity as primary and the
punishment of the human beings inside it as secondary. In their view, the entity can be evil
although the people who comprise it are mostly good. Unlike Baron Thurlow, they imagine that
the entity has not only an ethos but a soul. The devils inside it must be exorcised despite the
human cost. 60

60

Professor Beale writes:
[T]he argument that it is improper to impose criminal fines that effectively “punish” the “innocent”
shareholders, employees, creditors, and others, proves far too much. These arguments apply equally to
punitive damages, and indeed to any money judgment against a corporation, since such a judgment also
reduces the shareholders’ equity (as well as its ability to pay its’ employees and creditors).

Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. XX (2009).
Of course a widget-manufacturing company should pay for the steel it has purchased, and a court should
force it to pay if it refuses to honor its contract. Equally, this company shoul d pay for the injuries its employees
inflict in the course of their employment. These injuries are as much a cost of widget-production as the cost of steel,
and this cost should be reflected in the price of widgets. Forcing the corporation to pay even “punitive” damages
may be appropriate when wrongdoing is difficult to detect or when injuries are small enough that victims have little
incentive to sue. Although called punitive, these damages may do no more than require the corporation to
“internalize” some costs it has inflicted on people not before the court. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 582 (1996). Forcing the company’s innocent shareholders to pay the cost of producing widgets before they
pocket the profits is obviously appropriate. Punishing them when they have done nothing wrong is—equally
obviously—inappropriate.
Beale asks, “Do criminal penalties really differ in some fundamental way from other damages that are
properly imposed upon corporations?” Beale, supra, at XX. The answer is yes. The law distinguishes between civil
and criminal proceedings for a reason. Sadly, Professor Beale and many others have missed it.
Not only is the criminal punishment of corporations unjustified in principle; it is probably less effective in
practice than civil regulation. Civil regulation removes the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
permits the imposition of sanctions by administrative agencies rather than courts. See, e.g., V. S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (offering an extended argument
that civil sanctions deter corporate wrongdoing more effectively than criminal sanctions); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate
Crime and Its Control, in THE NEW P ALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF E CONOMICS AND THE LAW 492-97 (Peter Newman,
ed., 1998) (maintaining that lower procedural hurdles and sanctioning costs make civil penalties more cost-effective
deterrents of corporate wrongdoing than criminal punishment). The Supreme Court currently affords legislatures
broad leeway to declare sanctions civil rather than criminal. Criminal safeguards are required only when the
“clearest proof” establishes that a sanction is “so punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to ‘transfor[m] what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997)
(quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)) (overruling the more restrictive standard of
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
Of course nothing in this article opposes the regulation and taxation of corporations or the use of civil
sanctions to enforce the legal obligations of these entities.
On the European continent, corporations usually are not subject to criminal prosecution, but recent years
have seen substantial slippage in the American direction. See generally Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What

C. Manufacturing Leverage
Subjecting real wrongdoers and the fictional entities that employ them to prosecution for
the same crimes leads to sharp conflicts of interest. Corporate officers fearful of prosecution may
offer the corporation’s guilty plea and its payment of a substantial fine to avoid the risk of jail
themselves. The Justice Department once was receptive to these bargains, 61 but it now presses
hard in the opposite direction. Following the policy expressed in the 2003 Thompson
Memorandum 62 as modified by the McNulty Memorandum in 2006 63 and then by later
revisions, 64 it offers to let corporations off the hook in exchange for their assistance in
prosecuting their officers and employees. Since 2003, the Department has entered at least 103
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs) in which corporations
have avoided prosecution by waiving their legal rights and agreeing informally to the imposition

Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 89 (2004).
61
I recall being offended by several such bargains when I worked in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division in
1968-69, and the Department’s policy was apparently no different in 1985. In the spring of that year,
[defense attorney Tom] Curnin told [E. F.] Hutton's board that it faced two choices: plead guilty to a massive
list of felonies or face a trial that would likely see three senior Hutton executives convicted and drive Hutton
out of business. Curnin advised settling with the government . . . . O n May 2, Hutton agreed to plead guilty to
2,000 counts of mail and wire fraud, as well as pay a $2 million fine plus $750,000 for the cost of the
investigation. Hutton also agreed to pay $8 million in restitution . . . . In return, Curnin wrung two major
concessions [one of which was that] no Hutton executives would be prosecuted . . . .
Wikipedia, E.F. Hutton & Co., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E_F_Hutton (last visited September 30, 2009); see also
JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN 136 (1992); Nathaniel
C. Nash, E.F. Hutton Guilty in Bank Fraud: Penalties Could Top $10 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1985, at A1.
62
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t
Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm. [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
63
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components
& U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches
/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
64
The Department’s current Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations are contained in the U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 545, at §§ 9-28.000 to 9-28.1300.

of sanctions. 65 Many agreements have required the corporations to assist the government in
convicting their officers.
The Thompson memorandum authorized prosecutors to consider adversely both a
corporation’s failure to waive the attorney-client privilege and its advancement of legal fees to
officers under investigation. 66 The McNulty memorandum, however, softened the Thompson
memorandum’s language concerning waivers of the attorney-client privilege. 67 These waivers
became far less frequent in post-McNulty DPAs and NPAs. 68 Moreover, in 2006, a federal
district court held that the Department of Justice violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by pressing a corporate employer not to pay its officers’ legal fees. 69 Deferring to this decision,
the McNulty memorandum declared that, in evaluating cooperation, “[p]rosecutors generally
should not take into account whether a corporation is advancing or reimbursing attorneys’
fees.” 70 The Second Circuit later upheld the district court’s decision. 71
The McNulty memorandum noted that it was responding to concerns expressed by
“[m]any . . . associated with the corporate legal community.” 72 Thanks largely to the lawyers’
lobby, 73 the Department now allows corporations to pay the legal fees of their accused

65
See Lawrence D. Finder, Ryan D. McConnell, & Scott L. Mitchell, Betting the Corporation: Compliance or
Defiance? Corporate Pre-Trial Agreement Update 2008 at 11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1332033. Cases in which the government lets corporations off the hook altogether in return
for their assistance may not result in DPAs and NPAs.
66
Thompson Memo, supra note 623, at 5.
67
McNulty Memo, supra note 634, at 8-11.
68
See Finder et al., supra note 656, at 11. Even agreements that do not require explicit waivers of the privilege may
require cooperation that a corporation cannot give unless its lawyers reveal information obtained in confidence.
69
United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). The
district court later excluded the statements of two corporate officers because, in response to government pressure,
the corporation had threatened these officers with a loss of their jobs and of corporate payment of their legal fees
unless they gave the statements. United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
70
McNulty Memo, supra note 634, at 11; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 55, at § 9-28.730.
71
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
72
McNulty Memo, supra note 634, on the first of two pages preceding page 1.
73
See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on
Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 83-84 (2007) (noting that the Chamber of Commerce, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, former Attorney General

employees. Nevertheless, the Department may still demand as a condition of its favor that
corporations investigate these employees 74 and discipline or fire them. 75 What corporate
investigators learn, moreover, must be delivered to the government. 76 A later section of this
article will consider other features of the Justice Department’s DPAs and NPAs, including their
provisions for compliance programs and the appointment of corporate monitors. 77 For now, it is
enough to note that corporate criminal liability creates acute conflicts of interest for corporate
managers while affording enormous bargaining power to the government. 78
V. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Misguided though it is, corporate criminal liability is probably here to stay. Much to my
regret, we cannot return to the eighteenth century. The question in the twenty-first century is how
best to conceptualize this practice. There are two alternatives, which we can call deodand and
frankpledge.
A. The Corporation as Deodand
People indignant about an injury produced by a corporation’s employees may treat the
corporation as deodand. They may truly personify and hate the corporation. They may hate the
Edwin Meese, and former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger III had all denounced the Thompson
Memorandum).
74
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 545, at § 9-28.800 (describing the requisites of corporate compliance
programs).
75
See id. at § 9-28.900 (“Among the factors prosecutors should consider and weigh are whether the corporation
appropriately disciplined wrongdoers . . . .” ).
76
See id. at § 9-28.700 (“[T]he prosecutor may consider . . . the corporation’s willingness to provide relevant
information and evidence and identify relevant actors within and outside the organization, including senior
executives.”); id. at § 9-28.720 (“Whichever process the corporation selects [for gathering information], the
government’s key measure of cooperation must remain the same as it does for an individual: has the party timely
disclosed the relevant facts about the putative misconduct?”).
77
See infra text accompanying notes 131-560-54.
78
A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and his co-author
write that “in most cases—especially those resolved since the Thompson Memorandum was issued—cooperation is
perhaps the most important factor in a prosecutor’s assessment of whether to bring criminal charges against the
company itself.” Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memorandum in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1135 (2006). See also Andrew
Weissman, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2007) (“It is now a
commonplace position among the white collar bar post-Enron—among both defense and prosecution—that
corporate defense consists largely of being an arm of the prosecutor.”).

mahogany paneling, the Lear jet, the smokestack, the glass tower, and all of the people inside.
They—the mahogany and all of them—are responsible for the medical fraud, the oil spill, the
price fixing, and the illegal campaign contributions. To superstitious people, villains need not
breathe. They may include Exxon, Warner Lambert, and the cable company.
Scholars have advanced refined variations of the deodand position. Dan Kahan declares,
“Punishing corporations . . . is understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false
valuations that their crimes express. Criminal liability ‘sends the message’ that people matter
more than profits.” 79 Endorsing a similar “expressive retributivist” position, Peter Henning
observes, “The label ‘criminal’ has social significance aside from the particular punishment
imposed on the offender.” 80
The punishment of corporations can indeed be expressive, and so can the punishment of
other things. I myself have repudiated false valuations by punishing my computer. When a
family member or colleague has discovered my discipline of the machine, however, I have
usually been embarrassed. Expressing one’s values by smashing a computer can be therapeutic,
but it is not recommended for children or for grownups. 81
Henning, moreover, is correct that the label “criminal” has a special social significance.
He is not alone in arguing that corporate punishment is appropriate because it can stigmatize an
entity and affect its reputation in ways that civil liability cannot. 82 The word “criminal” has its
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Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-19 (1998).
Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM . CRIM. L. REV. XX
(2009).
81
Kahan’s penology echoes that of Emile Durkheim, who maintained that a society’s imposition of criminal
punishment furthers its solidarity. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62-66 (MacMillan
1933) (George Simpson, trans). To paraphrase both Durkheim and Kahan, imposing punishment expresses a
community’s values and feels really good. The society that slays together stays together.
82
See, e.g., Buell, supra note 434, at 491 (“[T]he criminal process can impose a unique form of reputational
sanction, the effects of which can flow through to institutional members in ways that promise to deter individual
wrongdoing and promote group endeavors toward compliance.”); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent:
Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (1990); Stephen A.
80

distinctive significance, however, because this word means blameworthy. Someone who applies
this word to objects and entities that are not blameworthy uses the label falsely. The desired
social stigmatization may not materialize, 83 and if it does, it occurs only because, once the label
is applied, some members of the public associate blameless things with real criminals. You can
fool some of the people all of the time, and that may be enough. 84
In an essay titled In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability,85 Lawrence Friedman
defends a position like that of Kahan and Henning. He recognizes that from a deterrent or
“economic” perspective, “criminal liability fares poorly as compared to civil liability.” 86 He also
recognizes that, because a corporation has no mind, it cannot be an appropriate target of “pure

Salzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U.L. REV. 421, 431-32 (1991); William S.
Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1285, 1311-12 (2000).
83
Compare Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U.L.
REV. 395, 414-15 (1991) (concluding that whether a firm’s act is sanctioned as a civil or a criminal wrong does not
significantly affect the damage its reputation suffers), with Buell, supra note 434, at 504 (“Managers and their
counsel apparently do not see civil and criminal sanctions as substitutes.”) and Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement,
Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 280 (2008) (“The perception that the reputational
consequences of a conviction could exceed even the substantial monetary penalties in any parallel civil litigation
explain why firms under investigation for criminal violations are willing to do almost whatever it takes—including
waiving attorney-client privilege, assisting the government’s prosecution of their senior officers, and paying millions
of dollars in civil fines—to avoid an indictment.”).
84
See HERBERT L. P ACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 273 (1968) (“The more indiscriminate we are
in treating conduct as criminal, the less stigma resides in the mere fact that a man has been convicted of something
called a crime.”).
Samuel Buell argues that blaming and punishing collective entities is not simply expressive. He advances
what might be called a mixed deodand-frankpledge position. Buell observes that organizations influence the
behavior of their members, that people do in fact blame organizations, and that blaming organizations can influence
people inside and outside these organizations to make the organizations better. See Buell, supra note 434, at 497,
501.
One wonders whether Buell would extend his defense of punishing collectivities to non-commercial
groups—say, college fraternities and families. The members of some fraternities influence each other to behave very
badly, and so do the members of some families. Fraternities and families can develop bad reputations, and a
fraternity or family’s reputation can prompt people to reform it. Buell argues for the punishment of a corporation
whenever one of its agents has committed a crime to “further[] the purposes of her institution.” Id. at 530. Would he
equally favor the criminal conviction of a family whenever one of its members committed a crime to advance the
family’s purposes? Or of a college fraternity when one of its members stole a keg of beer for a party?
85
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 833 (2000). The
author of this article teaches constitutional law at New England. He is not the Lawrence Friedman who teaches legal
history at Stanford.
86
Id. at 838.

Kantian retribution.” 87 Friedman nevertheless contends that expressive retributivism justifies
corporate punishment. “The expressive retributivist’s commitment is ‘to assert[] moral truth in
the face of its denial.’” 88
Friedman argues that punishing corporations differs from punishing mahogany in two
ways. 89 First, echoing a theme of Pamela Bucy, he observes that a corporation has an
“identifiable persona” or “ethos” distinct from the personalities of the people who work for it, 90
and second, he notes that a corporation can express itself. 91 The Supreme Court held in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 92 that corporations have a constitutional right to speak. 93
The Supreme Court’s argument in Bellotti, however, was that the act of incorporation
should not cause people to lose a right they would otherwise possess—the right to speak as a
group. 94 Imagine, then, an unincorporated group with an identifiable persona distinct from those
of its members and one that can express itself—a barbershop quartet. Imagine in addition that,
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Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 843 (quoting Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY AND J EAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 125 (1988)).
Andrew Taslitz writes:
88

[A]s a newer generation of scholars and policymakers have increasingly come to recognize, this vision of the
corporation [as an aggregation of its individual members] is seriously flawed. There are “social facts” with as
real consequences for political culture as any physical, material facts. In the social world, corporate persons
are real. They have an identity and a unique character separate and apart from that of their individual
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule,
76 MISS. L.J. 483, 532-33 (2006). Of course, in bygone social worlds and perhaps some current ones too, demoninfested animals and inanimate objects were real, and this “social fact” had consequences. For Professor Taslitz, the
fact that most people believe something apparently makes it a “social” fact, and because “social” facts are to be
treated as real facts, he would presumably endorse the punishment of animals and objects by the people who
inhabited these worlds. Taslitz might endorse human sacrifice too. That the gods wanted human blood was once a
social fact with as real consequences for political culture as any physical, material facts.
89
See Friedman, supra note 857, at 844-45 (adverting to my earlier use of the deodand analogy).
90
Id. at 847-48. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991).
91
Friedman, supra note 87, at 848-52.
92
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
93
Id. at 784-85.
94
Id. at 777 (“If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their
proposed speech.”).

without any knowledge on the part of the tenor, bass or baritone, the lead singer of this group has
bribed the judge of a music contest, stolen four plaid sports coats, and poisoned the lead singer of
a rival quartet. Would Friedman express his commitment to moral truth by convicting and
punishing the entire quartet? If not, would the group’s incorporation change the outcome? 95
Or consider another body with a persona distinct from those of its members that speaks as
an entity—the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. The release of “torture memos”
written by several lawyers of this Office during the administration of President George W. Bush
has prompted discussion of whether the lawyers should be prosecuted. 96 The Obama
administration’s Justice Department has seemed reluctant to proceed. Its willingness to let
bygones be bygones appears to be influenced by the political distraction a trial would cause.
No one appears to have considered a less ad hominem way of resolving the controversy—
exempting the lawyers from prosecution while authorizing a trial of the Office of Legal Counsel
itself. If this office were found guilty, it (or perhaps the entire Justice Department) could be
placed on probation and required to implement a compliance program, 97 or the Office might
enter a deferred prosecution agreement and allow a monitor to review its compliance efforts. 98
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In most states and in the federal courts, unions and unincorporated business associations can be convicted of
crimes. See WAYNE R. LAF AVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.5d (2d ed., Thomson West 2003).
96
See, e.g., Editorial, The Torture Debate: The Lawyers, N. Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A32 (discussing whether the
authors of the torture memos should be prosecuted or otherwise disciplined).
97
These sanctions are among those the Federal Sentencing Guidelines authorize for corporate offenders. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8D1.1(a)(3), 8D1.4(c)(1) (2008) (declaring that a convicted corporation with
50 or more employees is to be placed on probation and may be ordered to institute an effective compliance program
if it does not have one already). See generally Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017 (1992).
98
See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714-1716 (2007). Critics might object that because all of the Bush administration lawyers
have left the Office of Legal Counsel, criminal sanctions are no longer necessary. The departure of all breathing
wrongdoers from a corporation, however, does not save it from punishment. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual notes that
“the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been . . . fired, or they may have quit or retired.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 545, at § 9-28.700(B). This circumstance leads the Manual to declare, not that the Justice
Department should refrain from prosecuting the corporation, but only that the “corporation’s cooperation may be
critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence . . . and in doing so expeditiously.”
Id.

In addition, the Office might be fined. Critics might object that the sovereign Justice
Department cannot prosecute itself and also that it is pointless to take money from the public
treasury in order to pay this money into the public treasury. After a $50 billion bailout, however,
the federal government now owns 60 percent of General Motors. 99 Presumably this company is
still subject to prosecution for the crimes committed by its agents. Moreover, whether the
government owns a rescued corporation or not, this corporation may use the money it has
received from the treasury to pay its fines to the treasury. 100 If the government considers the
defendant too big to fail, it may then draw more money from the treasury to enable it to pay more
fines to the treasury. The carousel might go round and round. In the end, apart from some
administrative expenses, the process could be costless and wonderfully expressive. If Lewis
Carroll were still around, he could write about it. 101
B. The Corporation as Frankpledge
Most defenders of corporate criminal liability view it as frankpledge. They justify the
punishment of corporations on the ground that innocent managers, anxious to avoid the
punishment of innocent shareholders, will act as patrol officers. Everyone will police everyone
else and will have appropriate incentives to create a law-observant corporate culture. 102 With the
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corporations to monitor their employees efficiently. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U.L. REV. 687 (1997).
From an economic perspective, a sound system of individual and corporate liability must advance three
objectives—inducing corporate employees to act efficiently, inducing corporate monitors to monitor efficiently, and
encouraging the optimal pricing of a company’s product. Our current regime offers a curious mixture of strict and
fault-based liability. For the most part, our civil justice system seeks to promote the efficient conduct of corporate
employees by holding them liable only when they have acted negligently. At the same time, our criminal justice
system generally imposes liability only when an agent has inflicted harm with criminal intent. From a “frankpledge”
perspective, the principle of respondeat superior in civil cases then seeks to promote the efficient monitoring of
employees by holding firms strictly (and jointly) liable for the employees’ negligently produced harms, and the
principle of respondeat superior in criminal cases seeks to promote the efficient monitoring of employees by
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Thompson memorandum, moreover, the parallel to frankpledge becomes sharper still. The group
can avoid punishment by delivering the individual wrongdoer to the authorities. Echoing the
Norman Kings of England, the Justice Department’s Manual for United States Attorneys
declares, “Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to be a force for
positive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent, discover, and punish serious
crimes.” 103
The Normans’ version of frankpledge was in some respects less objectionable than its
twenty-first century analogue. William the Conqueror and his successors imposed a duty of
policing on every member of a tithing and imposed monetary sanctions when the tithing failed to
perform this duty effectively. The Normans did not imagine that the tithing was guilty of the
crimes committed by the people it failed to apprehend or that all of its members deserved
punishment for these crimes rather than for their own failures to police. 104
Our own criminal justice system frequently presses offenders to aid in the apprehension
and prosecution of other offenders. Ordinarily, however, it does not create crimes and threaten
the innocent simply to gain their cooperation. Our justice system does not, for example, declare a
drug dealer’s family, friends, and roommates guilty of his crimes simply because declaring them
criminals would strongly encourage their cooperation. Even if careful economic analysis could

holding firms strictly (and jointly) liable for the employees’ intentionally produced harms. Economists have long
debated the relative merits of negligence and strict liability, but as far as I can tell, the current regime does not
reflect any coherent economic principle. I do not understand why anyone imagines that this mixed system comes
close to producing optimal prices. See generally Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).
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show the imposition of this vicarious liability cost-effective, it would cause most non-economists
to gag. 105
Moreover, as Jennifer Arlen has noted, corporate criminal liability can backfire. It can
prompt managers to do less policing than they would if their firms faced only civil liability, for
internal policing may produce information that will lead to a firm’s indictment and conviction. 106
Consider, for example, the advice a lawyer might give a brokerage firm that is considering
whether to tape-record its brokers’ calls: “To the extent the proposed recordings deter brokers
from committing fraud, they will reduce the firm’s potential criminal liability. But if the
deterrence is imperfect, some tapes may contain evidence of fraud. These tapes will be subject to
subpoena, and when the government obtains them, it may use them to indict the firm and perhaps
put it out of business.” 107
I do not think highly of the institution of frankpledge, but it seems less silly than hating
an artificial person. Holding the members of a group responsible for the other members’ crimes
is not as strange as imagining that a legal fiction deserves punishment.
VI. SOME I MPLICATIONS OF THE COMPETING VIEWS
This section considers where the “deodand” and “frankpledge” views of corporate
criminal liability would take the law. Neither perspective justifies the federal courts’ current
standard of corporate liability, but the differing perspectives point to differing reforms. This
105

See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 40 (N.H. 1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute that punished parents when
their children drove off-highway vehicles on the highways).
106
See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 833,
836-37 (1994).
107
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discover. If corporate managers dread criminal conviction more than civil liability, however, the threat of criminal
prosecution is likely to magnify their fear of generating damaging evidence.
Especially because even one criminal act can potentially cause a firm’s demise and no one knows how
prosecutors will respond to the firm’s monitoring efforts, the effect of our regime of criminal liability on the
behavior of corporate managers is uncertain. A regime of strict liability on paper administered by prosecutors who
may consider innocence a full defense, a partial defense, or no defense at all is not one in which managers can easily
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section evaluates these reforms and explains why the political prospects of both reform proposals
are dim. Although the current standard of corporate liability is indefensible, it affords great
power to prosecutors. This section examines how prosecutors have used and abused their power.
It ends with a description of how judges who accepted the “frankpledge” perspective would
sentence corporate offenders.
A. The Respondeat Superior Standard of Corporate Liability
Neither the “deodand” view of corporate criminal liability nor the “frankpledge” view
justifies the respondeat superior standard now employed in the federal courts to determine a
corporation’s criminal guilt. 108
1. The Deodand View. A corporation’s “ethos” or “persona”—the essence alleged to
justify its punishment for “expressive retributive” reasons—is not established by the wrongful
act of a single employee, and the isolated wrongful act of a “high managerial agent” 109 may not
manifest a corporation’s “personality” either. Even the “rude Kukis of Southern Asia,” who
allegedly punished trees for fatal falls, 110 might have had difficulty hating an otherwise virtuous
corporation with tens of thousands of employees whenever one employee did something wrong.
Blaming an entity apparently demands an atmospheric assessment of the entity’s spirit,
and Pamela Bucy has proposed that juries make this assessment. She advocates what she calls
“the corporate ethos standard” and says that this standard “directs criminal liability toward only
those corporations which are ‘deserving’ of prosecution as demonstrated by their lawless
ethos.” 111
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Bucy elaborates:
To ascertain the ethos of a corporation, and to determine if this ethos encouraged the
criminal conduct at issue, the factfinder should examine: the corporate hierarchy, the
corporate goals and policies, the corporation’s historical treatment of prior offenses, the
corporation’s efforts to educate and monitor employees’ compliance with the law, and
the corporation’s compensation scheme, especially its policy on indemnification of
corporate employees. 112
Bucy would ask juries to consider whether a corporation’s board did its job or instead operated
as a figurehead, 113 whether corporate goals were “so unrealistic that they encourage[d] illegal
behavior,” 114 whether employees were “required to sign a statement each year indicating that
they are familiar with pertinent government regulations and indicating that that they realize
such violations will result in dismissal,” 115 whether the corporation had an ombudsman,116 and
more.
A medieval academic similarly might have opposed the indiscriminate punishment of
objects that killed people and might have proposed a more careful assessment of each object’s
ethos. Was an accused wheel well designed? Was it made of the best material? Was it inspected
and repaired on a regular basis? Had it previously provided useful service? Had it been involved
in prior accidents?
Bucy’s proposal provides few standards, invites prosecutors to appeal to the anticorporate sentiments of some jurors, and probably would yield outcomes based mostly on the
jurors’ proclivities, the trial lawyers’ rhetoric, and how much harm the defendant’s agents had
Of course organizations do differ in their ethoi. Some in fact are wholly devoted to criminal activity. The
most thoroughly criminal organizations, however—for example, the Bloods, the Crips, and the Mafia—are not
usually incorporated. Although these organizations sometimes have been named as defendants in civil injunctive
actions, see generally Scott E. Atkinson, Note, The Outer Limits of Gang Injunctions, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1693
(2006), I have never seen one of them prosecuted. Neither legislatures nor prosecutors nor anyone else has seen a
need to prosecute these organizations in addition to the criminals who inhabit them.
112
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113
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114
Id. at 1133.
115
Id. at 1136.
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Id. at 1137.

caused. The impossibility of translating deodand sentiments into an operational standard of
liability reflects the “let’s pretend” character of the group-blame concept, 117 and the difficulty of
formulating anything other than knee-jerk standards of culpability suggests placing the
punishment of organizations on a different basis. The goal of corporate criminal punishment
should be instrumental. It should be to induce an appropriate level of monitoring within an
organization and nothing else. 118
2. The Frankpledge View. If the goal of group liability is to encourage appropriate
monitoring, the issue should be whether the group has monitored appropriately. The Norman
inventors of frankpledge, however, did not address this question directly. Instead, they applied a
standard of strict liability, presuming a failure to monitor whenever one member of a tithing
escaped punishment for a serious crime.
The modern law of corporate criminality similarly employs a strict liability standard, but
the modern standard is worse. For one thing, even if the criminal has not escaped, this standard
presumes a failure to monitor whenever a member of the group has committed a crime. The
group’s delivery of the wrongdoer to the authorities may prompt forbearance or leniency, but it
does not eradicate the group’s responsibility. Moreover, the modern law treats any criminal act
by any member of a 10,000-person group as proof of the other members’ failure. That position is
roughly 1000 times more misguided than treating the wrongful act of any member of a tenperson group as conclusive proof of the other members’ default. A teacher who cannot determine
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which of his students misbehaved may keep an entire class after school, but even the most
tyrannical teacher does not detain every student in the school system.
The rule of strict liability arose because people believed that the acts of an agent could
be attributed to the agent’s principal, and that was that. The rule had no articulated purpose.
Courts and legislatures had decided to punish corporations, and they saw no other way to do it.
The rule of respondeat superior never had a reason, and there is no reason to retain it.
When one rejects deodand mythology and recognizes that the goal of corporate
punishment is to ensure an appropriate level of internal policing, the appropriate principle of
liability becomes clear. Whether a criminal case against a corporation can be triggered by the
criminal act of any employee or only by a criminaln act approved or tolerated by a high
managerial agent, the defendant should at a minimum be permitted to show as an affirmative
defense that it had an appropriate compliance program in place prior to this act. When a
corporation implements a suitable compliance program, it does what the authors of the law of
corporate criminal liability (at least the non-superstitious authors) meant it to do. The
government should ask for no more. 119
Strict respondeat superior liability gives managers an incentive to establish effective
compliance programs, but an affirmative defense of due care or appropriate monitoring would
give them a stronger incentive. The expected benefits of compliance programs are greater when
they can lead to a defense than when they cannot. Contrary to common intuition, strict liability
probably weakens rather than strengthens the deterrent force of the criminal law. 120 The Supreme
119
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(1997) (arguing that when the law treats reasonable mistakes of law as a defense, it encourages knowledge of the
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Court has in fact limited the respondeat superior principle in sexual harassment cases for
precisely this reason. Giving “credit . . . to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge
their duty” encourages them to establish programs to stop harassment. 121 It does so more
effectively than holding them strictly liable for whatever harassment occurs.
Rewarding firms for establishing compliance programs encourages them to establish
compliance programs. In addition, the proposed affirmative defense removes the incentive not to
monitor that strict respondeat superior liability sometimes creates. 122 A firm need not fear that
an appropriate compliance program would produce incriminating information that the
government could use to destroy it. 123
The United States Attorneys’ Manual lists “the existence and effectiveness of the
corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” as one of nine factors to be considered in
determining whether to file charges. 124 These factors are described as “additional” to “the factors
normally considered in the sound exercise of prosecutorial judgment: the sufficiency of the
evidence; the likelihood of success at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other
consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of noncriminal charges.” 125 The listed factors “are
intended to be illustrative” rather than “exhaustive,” 126 and “the existence of a compliance
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program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal
misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.” 127
The Manual does not notably confine the discretion of prosecutors. A prosecutor who
considers the listed factors and finds himself with some yeses, some no’s, and some maybes can
do whatever he likes. Indeed, even a prosecutor with all yeses or all no’s can do whatever he
likes. The Justice Department has never explained why the existence of an appropriate
compliance program should not be “sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a
corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or
agents.” 128 There appears to be only one thing beyond an appropriate compliance program the
government could want—perfection. The suitability of a compliance program, moreover, should
not be judged by the length of the chancellor’s (or prosecutor’s) foot. Rather, the question should
be one of cost-effectiveness: if additional or different expenditures on compliance would be
unlikely to prevent more harm than they would cost, a corporate defendant should not be
expected to make them. 129
B. The Real Purpose of the Respondeat Superior Standard
Although the current standard of corporate liability makes no sense from either the
“deodand” or the “frankpledge” perspective, a recent New York Times column by former
Attorney General John Ashcroft revealed why this standard has endured for 100 years and may
last 100 more.
Ashcroft’s column praised federal deferred prosecution agreements:
These court-authorized agreements . . . under certain circumstances offer[] more
appropriate methods of providing justice in the best interests of the public as well
as a company’s employees and shareholders. They avoid the destructiveness of
127
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indictments and allow companies to remain in business while operating under the
increased scrutiny of federally appointed monitors. 130
Ashcroft’s column did not directly answer the question, “compared to what?,” but its answer was
clear: compared to full enforcement of the law.
DPAs and NPAs do look great when compared to full enforcement of the law, but full
enforcement of the law is unthinkable. Every Fortune 500 company presumably has had at least
one employee who violated a federal criminal law while carrying out his duties. The law of
corporate crime thus makes every Fortune 500 company subject to prosecution, conviction, and
punishment. In addition to the reputational damage a criminal conviction is likely to bring,
conviction may bar a company from obtaining needed business licenses, holding a national bank
franchise, receiving Medicaid and Medicare payments, auditing the accounts of publicly traded
corporations, and contracting with the government. 131 The respondeat superior standard
apparently empowers the Justice Department to put most American companies out of business
and to bring the economy to a standstill—and to do so just as other federal agencies are
bolstering failing companies to keep the economy from coming to a standstill. 132
Ashcroft provided an example:
In September 2007, . . . the Justice Department and the nation’s five largest
manufacturers of prosthetic hips and knees reached agreements over allegations that
they gave kickbacks to orthopedic surgeons who used a particular company’s
artificial hip and knee reconstruction replacement products. The allegations meant
that the companies faced indictment, prosecution and a potential end to their
business.
Think of the effect on the community if these companies had been shuttered:
employees would have lost their jobs, shareholders and pensioners would have lost
their savings and countless people in need of hip and knee replacement would have
been out of luck, as these five companies accounted for 95 percent of the market.
130
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The Justice Department could have wiped out an entire industry that has a vital role
in American health care.
Instead, the companies paid settlements to the government totaling $311
million. They agreed to be monitored by private sector individuals and firms with
reputations for integrity and public service . . . . The monitoring costs were borne
exclusively by the companies, saving taxpayers tens of millions of dollars that
could be then used for other investigations . . . . In these types of circumstances, a
deferred prosecution agreement is clearly better for everyone. 133
Of course the nation need not fear a prosecutor-prompted economic collapse. No
prosecutor wants to put a corporation out of business simply because one rogue employee
committed a crime. Federal prosecutors merely want the power to put every corporation out of
business whenever a low-level employee has committed a crime. 134 This power enables
prosecutors to impose whatever sanctions they like for whatever conduct they do wish to punish.
The power to do the unthinkable lets prosecutors do the thinkable without much sweat. When
prosecutors exercise their sweeping powers responsibly (as nearly all of them believe that they
do), they may save the jobs of thousands of people and enable companies to stay in business—all
as measured from the fantasy baseline of full-enforcement. Like John Ashcroft, the prosecutors
may then congratulate themselves on their restraint.
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Practitioners at two recent conferences on corporate criminality agreed that, in
negotiating with the government, corporate suspects have a knife at a gunfight. 135 Even when an
accused corporation has a plausible defense, it usually cannot risk the adverse consequences of
an indictment, let alone a conviction. The corporation’s only bargaining chip comes from the
reluctance of prosecutors to pull the trigger. As one defense attorney explained, “If you’re
Boeing, the government no more wants to put you out of business than you want to go out of
business.” Defense attorneys report, however, that corporate boards do not respond favorably to
the argument, “We don’t think the government means to shoot.” These boards instruct counsel to
agree to whatever they must in order to avoid an indictment. 136
Although federal prosecutors pride themselves on their responsibility and restraint, they
cannot always be trusted. In his New York Times column, John Ashcroft acknowledged that he
served as a paid monitor for one of the five prosthetic manufacturing companies whose DPAs he
praised. 137 He failed to note that the company he monitored, Zimmer Holdings, had agreed to
pay his consulting firm, The Ashcroft Group, between $207 and $52 million for 18 months of
service. 138 By negotiating the Zimmer Holdings agreement, the United States Attorney for New
Jersey, Christopher J. Christie, had benefitted his former boss, Mr. Ashcroft, at least as clearly as
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he had benefitted the public. 139 In another DPA, Christie aided his law school alma mater, Seton
Hall, by requiring Bristol-Myers Squibb to endow a chair there in business ethics with a
contribution of $5 million. 140 And when Christie left the U.S. Attorney’s Office to run for
governor, he accepted $23,800 in campaign contributions from people connected with the law
firm of Herbert J. Stern, a former U.S. Attorney and federal judge whom Christie had chosen for
a $3 million monitoring contract. 141 The New York Times reports, “The Justice Department has
appointed at least 30 former prosecutors and other government officials as well-paid corporate
monitors in arrangements that allow companies to avoid criminal prosecution, according to . . .
data released . . . by Congress.” 142
Recent Justice Department memoranda limit the power of U.S. Attorneys to select their
friends as monitors 143 and to direct payments to favored law schools, 144 but even the best
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intentioned prosecutors may not merit the credit they give themselves for reasonableness and
good government. Whether the compliance programs and monitors imposed by DPAs and NPAs
can justify their high cost is an essentially unexamined question.
Federal prosecutors have shown little awareness that cost-effectiveness is the issue. The
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual invites prosecutors to consider whether a corporation’s compliance
program “is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting
wrongdoing.” 145 But of course there is no maximum. The amount of money a firm could spend
on monitoring is limited only by the amount of money it has. It might place a monitor or two at
every employee’s elbow, and no standard indicates at what point short of absurdity it must stop.
Once an employee of the firm has committed a crime, the firm’s monitoring obligations depend
on what feels right to a United States Attorney unconstrained by any standards.
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual acknowledges “that no compliance program can ever
prevent all criminal activity by a corporation’s employees,” 146 but defense attorneys at a recent
conference on corporate crime noted that prosecutors paid little attention to this provision. 147
When these attorneys pleaded for mercy by pointing to their corporate clients’ compliance
programs, prosecutors responded that the programs could not have been effective if the crime
occurred.
A 2009 study purports to examine “whether settlement agreements with corporate
monitors actually work to improve corporate behavior going forward.” 148 It concludes that “in

145

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 545, at § 9-28.800(B).
Id.
147
Video: Panel 3: How Should Corporate Compliance Programs Be Factored into Government Decisions,
Conference on Achieving the Right Balance: The Role of Corporate Criminal Law in Ensuring Corporate
Compliance, held by Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 21, 2009) (available at
http://www.chambercast.com/ramgen/video/ilr/090526d.rm).
148
Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679,
681 (2009).
146

general” these agreements “are at risk of not achieving their goals on any consistent basis.” 149 In
2005, Kimberly Krawiec reviewed the available empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
corporate ethics and conduct codes, internal compliance structures, and training programs
intended to reduce sexual harassment and increase diversity. She reported that the evidence was
sparse and “decidedly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodologically sound studies
finding no significant correlation between the most widely used internal compliance structures
and reduced organizational misconduct.” 150 Notably, none of the three large-scale studies that
purported to test the effectiveness of the compliance programs favored by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines indicated that these programs had reduced illegal conduct. Two of the three studies in
fact “found unanticipated positive correlations between internal compliance structures and legal
violations.” 151 How much compliance programs serve their stated purposes and how much they
are gimmickry and posturing remain open questions.
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Id. at 682. Essentially, this study shows only that ethics and compliance officers do not think highly of the
former prosecutors and others who are appointed as corporate monitors. The professionals complain that these
monitors lack experience, gain little understanding during their one-shot appointments, and focus more on
compliance mechanics than on developing an appropriate corporate culture. One senses that the compliance officers
might prefer the selection of members of their own fraternity. Their professional association, the Society of
Corporate Governance and Ethics, now offers training and an examination leading to certification as a compliance
and ethics professional. Id. at 692.
150
Kimberly Krawiec, Corporate Decisionmaking: Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model,
32 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 571, 591-97 (2005).
151
Id. at 593 (citing M. Cash Matthews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior, in 9 RESEARCH
IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 107, 108-09, 125 (William C. Frederick & Lee E. Preston eds.,
1987); Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of
the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS, 367 (2002); Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner III,
Motive, Opportunity, Choice and Corporate Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624 (1997)).
A positive correlation between compliance programs and violations might suggest only that the managers
of firms whose employees commit violations are likely to implement compliance programs. The positive correlation
between the number of fire trucks at a fire and the size of the fire does not indicate that fire trucks are ineffective at
fighting fires.
I doubt that any quantitative methodology can reveal whether monitors and compliance programs reduce
crime, but researchers can determine whether the telephone numbers set up to receive whistleblowers’ calls receive
well-founded complaints and whether corporate employees believe that the firm’s compliance programs have
changed either their own behavior or the behavior of others. I am more sympathetic to employee surveys of this sort
than Krawiec appears to be, but the evidence produced by these surveys is as inconclusive as that produced by the
data crunchers. Id. at 592.

Neither John Ashcroft nor any other Attorney General in the past century has sought a
narrowing of the respondeat superior standard of corporate liability. Although half the states
employ narrower standards, 152 Congress seems very unlikely to follow their lead. An alliance of
Ralph Nader, the Justice Department, and most Members of Congress could be expected to resist
any effort to deny prosecutors an important “tool” in the fight against corporate crime. Like the
rest of the federal criminal justice system, the respondeat superior standard transforms
prosecutors into czars while the politicians stand and say “yes, yes, yes.” 153 This standard serves
its real purpose marvelously. 154
C. The Prospect for Reform: Some Political Notes
For forty thirty years and more, writers have proposed that a corporation should not be
punished when it can “prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that it, as an organization,
exercised due diligence to prevent the crime.” 155 As noted, however, members of Congress are
not likely to approve a measure that opponents could characterize as soft on corporate crime.
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At a recent conference on the role of corporate criminal law, former Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson, the author of the Thompson Memorandum,156 suggested a less
political route to the approval of an “appropriate monitoring” defense. Thompson—now the
general counsel of PepsiCo and a supporter of the defense—proposed that the Supreme Court
adopt this defense as an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 157 Thompson’s
proposal, however, appears to conflict with the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that
procedural rules may “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 158
Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to approve an “appropriate monitoring” defense
as an amendment to the criminal rules, it might do so as a matter of federal common law in an
appropriate case. The Supreme Court and other courts altered the traditional common law when,
extending the holding of New York Central beyond cases in which Congress had spoken to the
issue, they approved general corporate criminal liability and the respondeat superior standard.
Courts have the power to revise their own handiwork.
A recent amicus brief in the Second Circuit authored by Andrew Weissmann and other
Jenner & Block lawyers advocated judicial revision of the respondeat superior standard. 159 This
brief emphasized that recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the application of this
crimes . . . by showing that the corporation in good faith did everything within its power to prevent the commission
of the offense”). For more recent support of an “appropriate monitoring” defense, see John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming
Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 321 (2004); Richard S. Gruner &
Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L.
731, 764-65 (1996); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of their Employees
and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279, 308-28 (1995); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal
Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007); Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good
Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537 (2007); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate
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standard even in civil cases. For example, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 160 the Court held
that an employer might be civilly liable for a supervisory employee’s sexual harassment of a
subordinate, but it allowed the employer “to show as an affirmative defense . . . that [it] had
exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and that
the complaining employee had failed to act with like reasonable care to take advantage of the
employer’s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that could have been avoided.” 161
Similarly, in Kolstad v. American Dental Association,162 the Court held that an employer
would not be liable for punitive damages simply because a supervisory employee had
intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in hiring. Even in a case of intentional
discrimination, punitive damages would be inappropriate if the discriminatory act was “contrary
to the employer's ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’” 163 The Court spoke of the
“perverse incentives” that strict adherence to the respondeat superior principle would create, 164
and it said, “‘Giving punitive damages protection to employers who make good-faith efforts to
prevent discrimination in the workplace accomplishes’ Title VII's objective of ‘motivating
employers to detect and deter Title VII violations.’” 165
Weissmann and his colleagues argued that the reasons for modifying the respondeat
superior standard in criminal cases were at least as compelling as the reasons for modifying it in
sexual harassment cases. Moreover, the reasons the Supreme Court gave for protecting
corporations from liability for punitive damages were also reasons for protecting them from
criminal conviction and punishment. The Second Circuit, however, summarily rejected the
160
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arguments of Weissmann’s brief on the ground that they were “contrary to the precedent of our
Circuit.” 166
A final route to the approval of an appropriate monitoring defense runs through the
Department of Justice. Unlikely though the prospect may seem, a fair-minded Attorney General
might abandon the noncommittal pablum-language of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and announce
that the Department will not charge corporations with crimes when they have implemented
appropriate compliance programs. 167 United States Attorneys and their assistants would be
unlikely to be too generous to corporate suspects in determining when this de facto defense
applied.
D. Sentencing Corporations
Viewing the punishment of corporations as frankpledge rather than deodand has
implications for sentencing corporations. Because corporate criminal punishment is not really
criminal punishment as people customarily understand it, harsh exemplary penalties are
inappropriate. The goal should be to induce an appropriate level of monitoring within the
organization.
Many laws and regulations—from the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to the rules of several administrative agencies to the corporation law of Delaware—
encourage firms to establish compliance programs. 168 Almost every publicly-traded corporation
now appears to have one, much to the benefit of lawyers’ bank accounts. 169 Some people appear
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to have forgotten that, although monitoring is a very good thing, an organization can have too
much of it. 170 For example, if a regime of monitoring and surveillance would cost $500,000 but
prevent criminal harms of only $100,000, the monitoring would be wasteful. A threatened fine of
$1 million for a $100,000 crime might induce a corporation to implement this wasteful
monitoring program.
Reluctant though I am to admit that economists can ever be right, some of them do
understand how best to calculate the fines of corporate offenders. 171 In most cases, a court
should assess the harm produced by the corporation’s criminal act and then make a judgment
about how often this sort of criminal act is detected. It should multiply the harm produced times
the ex ante chance that the crime would go undetected and then add a few dollars to tilt the
balance in favor of law observance. For example, if the offense has produced $1 million in harm
and the court’s judgment is that only one of every four similar offenses is likely to be punished,
the fine might be $4,010,000. This sort of fine would assure that crime would not pay but would
not require corporations to spend more to prevent crime than the crime is likely to cost. 172
A court should then subtract from the fine any civil damages the corporation has paid or
can reasonably be expected to pay as a result of its crime. If $500,000 in criminal fines would
induce appropriate monitoring, requiring the corporation to pay $500,000 in fines and then
$500,000 in civil damages could induce excessive monitoring.
compliance professionals have been at the forefront of the push to adopt internal compliance structures, sometimes
overstating to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt such structures and the benefits of having such
structures in place.” Id. at 611. Although “the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate both a new
legal risk and their ability to contain that risk though internal compliance structures has been well documented . . .
business organizations [have adopted] the legal compliance professionals’ recommendations.” Id. at 611-612
(citations omitted).
170
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171
The analysis that follows is drawn primarily from Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 319, 321-22 (1996). For a different economic perspective, see ARLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note
1024.
172
The suitability of this formula is unaffected by whether courts recognize appropriate monitoring as a defense. The
formula’s sanctions should induce firms to implement appropriate compliance programs whether or not the defense
is recognized.

Other economic issues are debatable. When a corporation’s gain from crime exceeds the
victims’ loss, should the fine require the corporation to disgorge this gain? Many economists
would say no, 173 but I think the answer is yes. The corporation’s shareholders may be innocent,
but they should not profit from a crime committed on their behalf. Courts should not encourage
crime even when, from the vantage point of economists, this crime is efficient. 174
Should the fine be reduced when it may cause the corporation to fail and innocent
employees to lose their jobs? Like the economists, I think the answer is no. If a company can
achieve financial success only by committing crimes, it ought to fail, and its employees ought to
seek work elsewhere. Similarly, if an appropriate level of monitoring to prevent the commission
of crimes would cause a company to fail, it should fail, and its employees should seek work
elsewhere. 175
Use of the proposed formula is not appropriate in every case, and even when appropriate,
it is unlikely to give judges a clear, practical yardstick for sentencing. When a corporation’s act
has been made criminal for reasons other than the economic harm it produces, the formula offers
no help. It also offers little help when the anticipated harm is uncertain, diffuse, and long-term.
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Consider, for example, a corporate officer who has violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act 176 by bribing a foreign official to approve a highly beneficial project. In the short run, the
officer’s bribery might have done more good than harm. Still, the officer should be punished as a
criminal, and the fact that his bribery was likely to accomplish good things should not reduce his
sentence. If the officer’s corporate employer did not appropriately discourage his conduct, the
employer should be subject to sanctions as well (preferably civil sanctions). Over the course of
many decisions, an honest foreign official will serve his country better than a corrupt one, but no
one can put a dollar value on this benefit. Similarly, the harm that bribery by an American
business may cause to peoples’ perception of America cannot be calculated. A court might
presume that the economic damage caused by the bribe equaled the amount of the bribe, for the
corporate officer presumably would have been willing to reduce his price or otherwise use these
funds to benefit the public in order to gain the consideration he received from the corrupt
official. Looking only to the amount of the bribe, however, would likely to underestimate
substantially the long-term harm.
In other cases, a court may be able to calculate the economic harm caused by a crime
with reasonable precision, but even when it can, it may be unable to offer more than a blind
guess about the frequency with which this sort of crime is detected.
Sometimes, to be sure, more than a blind guess may be possible. Daniel Fischel and Allan
Sykes note, for example, that the odds of detecting a major oil spill are one hundred percent. In
this sort of case, they say, the fine should simply equal the harm. 177 Yet even in this sort of case,
the formula may not help much. Harm means more than provable economic damages. In view of
the lasting environmental harm produced by an oil spill, an oil company should be encouraged to
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spend much more to prevent the spill than simply the cost of cleaning it up and compensating the
people who can prove damages. In many situations, assessing the total cost of crime—including
the psychological trauma it produces and a share of the salaries of the police officers,
prosecutors, and judges who bring offenders to justice—is impossible.
The point of the economist’s formula is just to suggest a general approach. Judges should
view the punishment of corporations as King Edgar the Peaceful would have if he had attended
the University of Chicago. They should not attribute intentionality and blame to an artificial
person, and they should not try to make this imaginary person suffer.
CONCLUSION
The reasons offered for punishing corporations as criminals are expressive and
instrumental. The expressive reasons match those that once might have been offered to justify
the punishment of animals and inanimate objects that produced harm (deodand). The
instrumental reasons match those that once might have been offered to justify punishing all
members of a group when one member eluded punishment for his crimes (frankpledge). Neither
set of reasons is very good, but the frankpledge set is better than the deodand set. Recognizing
that the reasons for punishing corporations are instrumental suggests a revision of the current
standard of corporate liability and also suggests an approach to corporate sentencing. The
expressive approach appears to dominate popular writing, but attributing blame to a corporation
is no more sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other
instrumentality of crime.

